Capital Adequacy vs. Liquidity Requirements in Banking Supervision in the EU. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 84, 1 October 2005 by Lannoo, Karel & Casey, Jean-Pierre.
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.be) 
© CEPS 2005 
T
h
i
n
k
i
n
g
 
a
h
e
a
d
 
f
o
r
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
Capital Adequacy vs. Liquidity Requirements 
in Banking Supervision in the EU 
Karel Lannoo & Jean-Pierre Casey* 
 
The debate on banking supervision over the last 
decade has largely focused on capital 
requirements and solvency of financial 
institutions. The interaction between solvency 
and liquidity has been much less debated. 
Traditionally, it was assumed that once solvency 
was under control, liquidity should pose no 
problem. Banks with sufficient capital should be 
able to obtain extra liquidity from the central 
bank against adequate collateral if needed. 
Furthermore, the aim of the New Basel Accord 
to create a better alignment of regulatory 
capital with the risk to which banks are 
exposed, and the stronger focus on 
diversification, should eventually reduce 
mismatches between solvency and effective 
liquidity.  
In day-to-day banking supervision, control is 
also exercised over the liquidity of banks as an 
additional means to safeguard the stability of 
the financial system. This can be done in 
different ways. The central bank, as lender of 
last resort, may levy a reserve requirement. 
The banking supervisor can impose specific 
liquidity requirements. The way in which the 
latter is exercised in the EU today is not 
harmonised; it is left to the host country and is 
a matter of supervisory discretion. In the 
context of the difficult home/host discussions 
surrounding the implementation of the New 
Basel Accord in European law, it would be 
useful if the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS) would initiate some 
standardisation process specifying what liquidity 
control actually encompasses. The longer-term 
ambition would be to strengthen the home-
country control regime in an EU context. 
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This paper discusses the approach to be taken with regard 
to control of liquidity in the EU. To put the subject into 
perspective, we will first review the developments in 
financial market liquidity and then discuss the possible 
impact of the New Basel Accord on the liquidity of 
financial institutions. The assumption behind liquidity 
control is that banks primarily invest in illiquid assets 
(loans). However, market liberalisation, product 
innovation and technological developments have radically 
increased financial market liquidity. Furthermore, the new 
Basel capital adequacy framework profoundly modifies 
the current prudential framework. The third part analyses 
liquidity control in the context of EU financial 
regulation,and discusses whether liquidity control should 
be harmonised in the EU, and if so, how this could be 
done. The paper concludes with policy recommendations. 
1. Central Elements of the Debate on Financial 
Market Liquidity  
There can be no question that financial markets are 
structurally far more liquid today than they have been in 
the past. By structurally liquid is meant that – abstracting 
from the occasional episodes of market stress, when 
liquidity freezes across several broad asset classes – asset 
markets are generating greater trading volumes at reduced 
transaction costs than they have in the past when the 
market mechanism operated smoothly. Technological 
progress, coupled with global capital flows and 
worldwide de-regulation of the financial sector, has 
enhanced the liquidity of individual assets and markets 
alike. In particular, recent technological breakthroughs, 
particularly in the realm of informatics, have contributed 
greatly to enhancing market liquidity. Electronic trading 
platforms have transformed the nature of secondary-
market activity by transforming largely illiquid assets into 
very liquid ones. Prior to their introduction, search costs 
were certainly not insignificant, particularly when looking 
for counterparties to handle large orders or illiquid assets. 
Before the invention of the internet, finding a 
counterparty in some cases was so costly as to prevent 
trades from occurring in the first place. O’Hara (2004) 
gives the example of how eBay transformed the market 
for second-hand goods, including highly illiquid exotic 
collectibles.  
Securitisation is also an excellent example of how 
financial innovation, by packaging illiquid securities (e.g. 
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mortgages or loan portfolios) into tradeable ones, has 
transformed secondary markets in some existing 
instruments and, in other cases, has effectively created a 
market where none previously existed. Besides the 
intrinsic value in rendering securities more liquid, thereby 
facilitating resource allocation, greater liquidity in 
existing products and the introduction of liquidity-
creating products also mean that hedging opportunities 
increase, which facilitate and enhance the efficiency of 
risk management.  
Finally, one cannot ignore the role of regulation in the 
design of markets. Regulation affects market quality, an 
important component of which is liquidity. Great strides 
have been made in improving market design in recent 
years, as a result of both more effective self-regulation 
and better-targeted government regulation, with positive 
consequences for liquidity. Confidence-enhancing market 
rules, such as best execution and price transparency 
requirements, and competition among market-makers, 
leading to reduced transaction costs from trading, are but 
just two examples of how market structure can influence 
liquidity.
2  
So much for the impact of innovation and market 
microstructure on liquidity. Yet, there also exists a 
broader macroeconomic interpretation of liquidity, which 
relates to how real economic activity, in particular 
monetary and fiscal policy impulses, coupled with 
behavioural anomalies such as herding and similar risk-
management strategies, translates into and influences the 
creation, destruction, valuation and price volatility of 
financial assets. According to this view, liquidity, defined 
as the creation and mobilisation of previously unexploited 
financial capital, or the re-allocation of capital to other 
usage, moves into and out of markets in conjunction with 
macroeconomic fluctuations, conditioned by expectations 
(broadly writ) and on the available supply of assets, which 
itself is determined (in part) by monetary and fiscal 
policy.
3 Certainly monetary policy, like fiscal policy, has 
                                                        
2 The central issue in the debate on the EU’s recent Directive 
(2004/39/EC) on markets in financial instruments was the 
need to enhance liquidity and price discovery in European 
equity markets. For this reason, also brokers are required to 
advertise the prices for shares in which they are ‘systemic 
internalisers’. See Levin (2003) for a discussion of this issue. 
3 For example, in 2001, the US Treasury announced that it 
was retiring and discontinuing 30-year debt issues. This was 
a direct consequence of the fiscal consolidation that 
prevailed under Robert Rubin’s tenure as Treasury Secretary, 
because if such a policy had been continued, it would have 
led to very significant budget surpluses. The projected 
surpluses led the Treasury debt management office to 
reconsider their strategy. At the time, there was an active 
debate on the consequences of the great US fiscal 
consolidation on financial markets. Market participants in 
particular were concerned about the liquidity effects of the 
deficit reduction. Such a reduction would mean obviating the 
need for relatively less liquid issues, such as the 30-year 
bond, which nevertheless played a key role in determining 
inflationary expectations and in establishing a benchmark 
a key role to play in the creation of financial assets. 
Figure 1 shows the rapid acceleration of liquidity in 
recent years as a consequence of lax monetary policy, in 
particular global spillovers from the generous Japanese, 
and, more recently, US stances.  
Figure 1. Evolution in global liquidity, 1993–2003 
 
The ability of investors to acquire/liquidate positions 
rapidly across assets (market breadth) and in an asset 
(market depth) has traditionally been viewed, by 
macroeconomists at least, as potentially destabilising. 
‘Excess’ liquidity can have damaging consequences for 
financial stability by leading to speculative feedback 
loops, such as momentum trading, that prevent the 
reversion of asset values to their true economic values. 
Because of the destabilising property of liquidity, in times 
of financial duress at least, liquidity must be constrained 
or harnessed. By arguing that liquidity begets financial 
stability, O’Hara (2004) and microstructure theorists take 
the contrary view. Liquidity for them is the grease that 
oils the market mechanism. In a similar manner, liquidity 
has been compared to the ‘lifeblood’ of financial markets 
by Fernandez (1999).  
According to the macroeconomic approach to liquidity, 
markets are (in part) more liquid today because the 
growth in the efficiency of financial intermediation, 
combined especially with rapid rates of capital growth, 
has outpaced growth in good investment opportunities in 
                                                                                                
risk-free rate for long-term corporate bond and project 
valuation. The reversal in fiscal policy in the US since 2001 
has meant that the projected surpluses are non-existent. As a 
result, US taxpayers would not be penalised as a 
consequence of Treasury emitting long-term bonds, because 
servicing 30-year bonds would no longer be 
disproportionately expensive. In addition, there is an 
enormous demand for long-term sovereign (and even 
corporate) debt, driven by the need of pension funds and 
insurance firms to generate steady streams of incomes over 
extended periods of time to match their long-term liabilities.  CAPITAL ADEQUACY VS. LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS IN BANKING SUPERVISION IN THE EU | 3 
 
the (largely slow-growing) real economy. Very rapid 
credit creation, fuelled by a lax monetary policy stance 
and coupled with large-scale capital inflows, means that 
the domestic monetary base is growing very quickly – too 
quickly for truly sound and profitable investments to 
mature – thereby saturating the existing opportunities in 
the real economy. As a result, in the quest for higher 
returns, financial institutions take on more risk and turn 
increasingly to speculative investments in asset markets, 
hoping that they will be able to liquidate their positions 
when signs of a crisis first begin to emerge. It is precisely 
the creation of excess ‘liquidity’ in the macroeconomic 
sense that eventually leads to dangerous financial 
imbalances. Thus, it would seem that there is a certain 
tension between the microstructure view of liquidity (a 
good thing) and the macroeconomic view of liquidity (a 
potentially dangerous thing). 
Among the biggest risk-management challenges of the 
future is finding a way to respond effectively, and 
preferably to prevent, financial instability that arises 
endogenously, as a result of market participants’ 
behavioural patterns, rather than due to some asset-
specific characteristics or to an individual institution’s 
position. The emphasis that has been placed on capital 
requirements reflects the continuing bias towards the old 
paradigm that places institutional stability (the micro-
prudential approach) at the heart of financial market 
stability, as opposed to focusing on broader correlations 
between institutions’ returns, reactions to market stress 
and risk-taking positions (the macro-prudential approach). 
According to the old paradigm, institutional stability is a 
precondition for market stability, that is, systemic crises 
find their origin in insolvent individual institutions. While 
this ‘classical’ type of financial crisis can still occur, the 
combination of capital account liberalisation and the 
introduction of innovative financial products such as 
asset-backed securities and derivatives have connected 
what previously had been largely segmented markets, 
leading to “correlations between previously independent 
asset classes,” as noted by Andrew Large (2004). Greater 
correlations in prices, returns and volatility between asset 
classes have important ramifications for the stability of 
markets in times of duress. For example, liquidity shocks 
to one asset class can nowadays be transmitted with much 
greater ease and speed to other asset markets, that is, the 
potential for contagion has risen greatly as a by-product 
of the growing inter-dependence of asset markets. 
Part of the challenge is to discover the determinants of 
market liquidity. While there is little doubt that the 
liquidity of individual assets has been enhanced through 
financial innovation and technological progress, market 
liquidity can still be susceptible to mysterious vagaries, or 
‘liquidity black holes’,
4 the determinants of which largely 
remain a puzzle to economists. The inability of 
economists to properly calibrate liquidity risk no doubt 
                                                        
4 By ‘liquidity black holes’ we mean how the liquidity of 
certain assets, which, under ‘normal’ circumstances are very 
liquid, suddenly dries up. 
has given rise to one of the most pressing challenges in 
risk management today.  
Exposure to common liquidity shocks has become an 
increasingly important source of vulnerability to market 
risk today. Whereas in the past, the concept of liquidity 
focused more on asset-specific liquidity or institutional 
liquidity (a bank’s ability to effectively manage its 
liabilities without inducing excessive funding gaps), 
recent research points to aggregate, or market, liquidity 
effects, since the characteristic liquidity of assets is seen 
to co-vary (Porter, 2003). Regulatory attention has turned 
to banks, because they are increasingly vulnerable to 
wider fluctuations in market liquidity. The composition of 
banks’ portfolio holdings, as well as the very nature of 
their risk-taking activities has changed dramatically in the 
past two decades. Tradable instruments represent an ever-
greater percentage of a bank’s assets. Banks must 
therefore pay more attention to market liquidity, because 
its changing nature means that their traditional approach 
to liquidity management, which is intimately tied to asset-
liability management) is no longer sufficient.
5  
The Limits of Setting Aside ‘Liquidity Capital’  
Since liquidity is a major component of risk, it would 
seem logical that banks should set aside reserves of 
capital to mitigate this risk. In fact, there is evidence that 
they already do so. Hartmann (2004), citing some studies, 
argues that if banks endogenise the capital decision, they 
will keep capital reserves above those required by the 
minimal regulatory capital amount in order to have a 
buffer against shocks to asset prices. But the fact that 
banks set aside ‘liquidity reserves’ abstracts from the 
difficulties of implementing a common regulatory 
approach to managing liquidity risk. There are several 
limits to the benefits of setting aside ‘liquidity capital’: 
1) Market liquidity risk is more difficult to quantify than 
individual security liquidity. First, there is no 
consensus on a definition of liquidity, or on a variable 
that would satisfactorily proxy it. The most commonly 
used proxies are bid-ask spreads and trading volumes. 
Liquidity risk is also difficult to price because the 
liquidity premium varies significantly over time. In 
addition to variability, the interaction between 
liquidity and expected returns may be non-linear 
(Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). Thus, liquidity risk 
management is complicated by the fact that liquidity is 
notoriously difficult to forecast. Although liquidity no 
doubt has an important auto-regressive component, for 
example when measured as trading volumes, it is 
likely that this component decays rather quickly and 
has little predictive power over longer time horizons.  
                                                        
5 Traditionally, poor liability management resulting from a 
maturity mismatch would lead to a level of illiquidity that 
would undermine the confidence of depositors. These in turn 
would seek an exit for their deposits, provoking a typical 
bank run.  4 | LANNOO & CASEY 
 
2) There are probably instances when liquidity can be ‘too 
much of a good thing’. This old debate gained a 
renewed vigour following the wave of financial crises 
that swept around the globe from 1997 to 2000. It fits 
into the general negative perception of liquidity of 
macroeconomists. A very liquid bank portfolio could 
lead to financial instability by possibly providing a 
perverse incentive to bank management to undertake 
greater risk (Wagner, 2004). The logic is that the more 
liquid a bank’s assets, the more likely that bank 
management will be tempted to put a fair amount of 
that liquidity to good work by converting liquid assets 
into riskier, less liquid assets that yield higher returns. 
In this sense, bank management is impervious to the 
fact that market liquidity can quickly dry up and that 
closing those positions will be enormously costly to 
the bank as they sell assets at deep discounts. 
Paradoxically, requirements for banks to set aside 
more reserves to act as buffers against liquidity shocks 
could encourage greater risk-taking with the residual 
capital of the bank. 
3) Assets that are liquid today are not necessarily going to 
be liquid on the date that bank management expects 
them to be liquid. Risk management strategies based 
on historical data are unlikely to be very useful in the 
face of extreme events. The perceived tradability of 
assets, or their ‘structural liquidity’, based on 
historical data, does not guarantee that they will be 
marketable at a time of duress when the bank will seek 
to liquidate them to generate the needed cash to fund 
liabilities.
6 In fact, markets themselves are prone to a 
host of unpredictable malfunctions, which can be 
technical in nature (operational risk), or due to any 
other sources of distress, whether linked to the 
specificities of the existing market architecture or to 
the behavioural patterns of market participants. Due to 
the vagaries of market liquidity, what liquidity there is 
in the market today may in fact be a very poor 
indicator of the liquidity that remains in the market 
tomorrow, highlighting the risks inherent in liquidity 
management. These difficulties point to the ever-
increasing importance of extreme value theory. In this 
sense, the techniques used to measure liquidity risk 
might be similar in methodology to those used to 
evaluate operational risk. The lack of contingency 
planning in the wake of very rare but severe 
occurrences can have very serious consequences, as 
the LTCM case demonstrated.
7  
                                                        
6 A good example of this is the impact the 1998 LTCM crisis 
had on US Treasuries, the most liquid securities in the world. 
Very quickly, the liquidity that had traditionally 
characterised US debt securities as the safest in the world, 
suddenly vanished.  
7 Leveraged over 50:1, the LTCM’s collapse had serious 
consequences for the world economy in 1998 and could have 
been a lot worse had the Federal Reserve not coordinated a 
bailout. 
But if one agrees that contingency planning against 
sudden ‘liquidity black holes’ may be necessary, 
particularly in light of recent financial crises, what 
precisely does this entail for banks? What does it mean 
for a bank to be ‘liquid’? Of course, liquidity is 
intrinsically linked to a time variable and suggests a short-
term horizon, a certain immediacy. It makes little sense 
today to worry about the liquidity of a traded asset that 
has to be liquidated at a fixed date in the distant future, 
since its liquidity is likely to vary significantly in the 
meantime. That is why liquidity requirements as such will 
not do terribly much to ensure the smooth operation of 
markets. This is due not only to structural features, but 
also to the nature of regulations. While attention on Basel 
II has focused on the dangers of pro-cyclicality, less 
attention was given to the impact and risks of financial 
institutions adopting identical risk capital requirements, 
which could propel herd movements (Persaud, 2000).  
The bottom line for policy is this: there is no point in 
holding reserves if, at times of crisis, they cannot be 
liquidated. On the other hand, the lack of proper 
contingency planning has proven tremendously costly in 
the past. Most economists agree that something must be 
done, without knowing precisely what. One thing is sure: 
regulators ought to carefully study the behavioural 
changes in risk management that any liquidity 
requirements could induce, because paradoxically further 
reserve requirements for liquidity at risk (LaR) could 
entail greater risk-taking by banks. 
2. The New Basel Accord and Liquidity Risk 
The new Basel capital adequacy framework, which was 
finalised in June 2004, profoundly modifies the current 
prudential framework. The 1988 Basel Accord, as 
embodied in EU law through the own funds and solvency 
ratios Directive, set very crude risk weightings of assets, 
depending on the perceived riskiness of the creditor. The 
New Basel Capital Accord goes for a much more refined 
risk management framework, which should also reduce 
the overall liquidity risk of financial institutions. In 
addition, Basel II introduces the concepts of supervisory 
review (Pillar 2) and market disclosure (Pillar 3), which 
should further contribute to liquidity control. Basel II 
does not specifically discuss liquidity requirements, but 
the Committee addressed the subject in a separate paper, 
which is discussed below. 
With regards to Pillar 1, the minimum capital 
requirement, the New Basel Accord offers alternative 
approaches to credit risk measurements, ranging from the 
standardised approach to a more sophisticated form in the 
internal ratings-based (IRB) approach. While the 
standardised approach is the simplest, it incorporates a 
finer gradation of risks based on the assessments of 
external rating agents of the different weighting 
categories of claims. Whereas before, Basel applied 
grosso modo four groups of weightings, there are now 
seven in the standardised approach. CAPITAL ADEQUACY VS. LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS IN BANKING SUPERVISION IN THE EU | 5 
 
The IRB approach ranging from the foundation to the 
advanced approach allows banks to adopt their internal 
rating systems to measure credit risk and this after a 
proper validation by the relevant national supervisory 
authorities. These risk sensitive approaches are supposed 
to reflect the real risk profile of the banks while taking 
into account the entire body of credit portfolio assessment 
criteria. As such, the IRB approach represents a 
considerable amount of complexity but permits a fine and 
efficient internal risk assessment.  
The New Basel Capital Accord also introduces a new 
regulatory framework to credit risk associated with 
securitisation. To measure the associated risk, banks can 
either apply the standardised approach or the internal 
rating-based (IRB) approach with the additional 
distinction between the ratings-based approach (RBA, in 
which some risk-weighted inputs are provided by the 
supervisors and others by the bank) and the supervisory 
formula approach (SFA, in which all the risk-related 
inputs are provided by the bank based on its internal data 
and modelling systems).  
Another major novelty introduced by the New Basel 
Accord is to set a capital requirement for operational 
risk.
8 To measure this type of risk, three approaches that 
vary in sophistication are provided by the Accord: a) the 
basic indicator approach, b) the standardised approach 
and c) the advanced measurement approaches. Hence, 
capital requirements should be much better calibrated 
under the New Basel Accord, and closer correlated to the 
effective risk profile of a bank. 
The expected use of the IRB approaches by the 
systemically important banks, as compared to the 
standardised approach by smaller banks, should enhance 
the resilience of the financial system. Banks using the 
IRB approach of Basel II would have to hold higher 
capital charges for higher-risk segments, such as low-
rated SMEs, low-rated sovereigns, asset management or 
custody activities, sub-investment grade securitisation 
transactions (risk weights ranging from 100% to 650% for 
securitised transactions rated BBB– to BB– under the 
RBA and the requirement in various instances, typically 
for below-investment grade and unrated transactions, to 
deduct a securitisation position from regulatory capital
9). 
These activities require less capital under the SRB 
approach because of their limited sensitivity to risk. 
However, capital charges for retail loans, consumer credit, 
mortgage or leasing activities, all of which can be 
considered illiquid, will decrease in both approaches.  
                                                        
8 Operational risk is defined by the Basel Committee as “the 
risk that flaws in a bank’s own systems or human resources, 
as well as external events, may cause unexpected losses, 
such as those related to mass litigation, fraud or natural 
catastrophes”. 
9 When this happens, such capital must be taken 50% from 
tier 1 and 50% from tier 2.  
The New Basel Accord has been widely debated in recent 
years. Two critical elements are relevant in the context of 
this paper: the pro-cyclicality and the impact of expected 
reduction in levels of regulatory capital. The expected 
increased pro-cyclicality of the Accord follows from its 
increased risk sensitivity, with the use of rating agencies 
assessments under the standardised approach, and, even 
more, the use of probability of default under the IRB 
approaches. Risk weights will thus become more 
cyclically sensitive and capital requirements more 
influenced by the state of the economy. In addition, the 
use from 2005 onwards of international accounting 
standards (IAS), which are based on the principle of fair 
value, will further exacerbate economic cycles. Both 
elements may further aggravate general liquidity crises in 
times of stress and render the setting of liquidity 
requirements even more difficult. Pressure to increase the 
capital requirement in times of stress may increase 
volatility on banks’ more liquid asset items. It has 
therefore been suggested to introduce a system of 
dynamic provisioning, as is in place in Spain (Dierick, 
2004).  
Another element of concern is the impact of the expected 
reduction in the overall level of regulatory capital. The 
EU’s 3
rd quantitative impact study forecasted a regulatory 
capital reduction of up to 20% under the IRB approach 
(Ayadi & Resti, 2004, p. 18). US authorities recently 
came out with a study predicting a reduction of 26% 
(Bies, 2005). Seen in combination with the increased pro-
cyclicality, the financial system overall could be less 
sound, and a liquidity requirement less relevant, as it 
would function less of a buffer in times of stress. The 
question thus is how supervisors will approach this 
problem as part of the supervisory review process. 
Basel Committee Guidelines on Liquidity 
Requirements 
In February 2000, the Basel Committee issued its 
Principles for the Assessment of Liquidity Management 
in Banking Organisations. This paper is an update of its 
September 1992 paper on the subject. According to the 
Committee, liquidity management is one of the most 
important activities conducted by banks. Since liquidity 
shortfalls at the level of one individual bank can have 
serious systemic repercussions, supervisors are also 
concerned. 
The principles largely focus on the management of a 
bank’s liquidity, although they also speak briefly about 
the role of supervisors and public disclosure. The paper 
does not set any quantitative thresholds for liquidity 
regulation, either on the side of the banks or on the 
regulators.  
On the management side, the principles require the bank 
to have: 
−  a strategy to manage liquidity on a day-to-day 
basis, agreed by the board, effectively 6 | LANNOO & CASEY 
 
implemented and backed-up by a internal control 
system; 
−  a process to measure and monitor net funding 
requirements; 
−  a contingency plan to handle liquidity crises, 
including public relations management; 
−  a specific analysis of foreign currency exposure 
and eventual mismatches that may occur; and 
−  an adequate level of disclosure in order to 
manage public perception of the organisation 
and its soundness. Banks should provide an 
adequate amount of information to the public on 
an ongoing basis. 
Supervisory authorities should conduct an independent 
evaluation of the implementation of these principles by a 
bank, and of the internal control system. As part of that, 
supervisors should also consider a bank’s liquidity risk in 
conjunction with its capital adequacy. In this sense, the 
role of supervisors falls under Pillar 2 of the new Basel 
capital adequacy regime, since:  
Appropriate supervisory responses to a bank with 
higher liquidity risk may include requiring the 
maintenance of higher levels of capital and 
repositioning the asset portfolios or funding 
arrangements to reduce liquidity risk. As part of this 
supervisory process, supervisors may also want to 
consider implementing regulatory requirements for 
certain liquidity limits or ratios (Basel Committee, 
2000, p. 20). 
Seen in combination with the implementation of the New 
Basel Accord, higher (macro) liquidity risk, which results 
from the pro-cyclicality and the lower capital levels of the 
New Basel Accord, may result in higher liquidity 
requirements for banks, or increased use of the powers of 
discretion by supervisors under Pillar 2, hence creating a 
dangerous vicious circle! 
3. The EU Framework  
The introduction of the euro has indirectly done more for 
the alignment of liquidity requirements in the EU, or at 
least in the euro area, than EU financial market 
regulation. The start of EMU led to the introduction of 
minimum reserve requirements for all credit institutions 
in the euro area. The European Central Bank (ECB) also 
harmonised the list of acceptable collateral for liquidity 
providing operations by the central bank and payments 
through the TARGET system. But liquidity requirements 
have not been harmonised under EU financial law. 
The Euro Area Framework  
A reserve requirement is the minimum amount of deposit 
a credit institution is required to hold on accounts with the 
central bank. The amount is calculated by multiplying the 
reserve ratio with the reserve base, which are most short-
term liability items of banks. Although the reserve 
requirement is essentially used for monetary policy 
purposes, i.e. to stabilise money market interest rates, it is 
also used to monitor the liquidity needs of the banking 
sector, and thus to steer financial stability. The reserve 
ratio was set at 2% since the start of EMU, and the 
holdings are remunerated at close to money market 
interest rates. 
Before EMU, reserve requirements differed largely in the 
euro area countries. They differed in the base, the ratio 
and remuneration. In several EU countries, they were not 
remunerated and thus functioned as a form of levy on the 
banking system. 
A second element through which the ECB contributed to 
easing the liquidity needs of the banking sector was the 
harmonisation of acceptable collateral for liquidity-
providing operations. Eligible assets comprise tier 1 and 
tier 2 collateral. Criteria for tier 1 were harmonised, tier 2 
assets were defined by the national central banks (NCBs), 
based upon minimum standards set by the ECB. Tier 2 
comprised less- or non-marketable assets (commercial 
loans) that are of particular importance for national 
financial markets and banking systems. In May 2005, the 
ECB further harmonised all acceptable collateral in a 
single list. Collateral is held in 18 securities settlement 
systems. All assets can be used on a cross-border basis. In 
this sense, the euro area has contributed to easing liquidity 
constraints in the euro area banking system, certainly for 
smaller member states. 
The same list of eligible collateral is used for participation 
in the high-value payment system of the ECB, TARGET. 
Minimum reserve holdings are requested from 
participating banks for settlement purposes during the day 
and the Eurosystem provides unlimited (collateralised) 
intra-day credit free of interest to its counterparties. The 
Eurosystem furthermore has standing facilities to provide 
and absorb liquidity in exceptional circumstances. The 
marginal lending facility provides overnight loans from 
the central bank against collateral at a rate that has been 
about 1% above the main refinancing rate. 
The Eurosystem’s definition of acceptable collateral is 
also used in the private repo market, which plays an 
important role in providing temporary liquidity to 
financial institutions. The private repo market has been 
growing at a high rate over the last few years. Data from 
the private sector showed a growth of over 20% in the 
year 2004, standing at €5 trillion (ISMA, 2005). 
The Single Market Framework  
EU financial markets regulation says little about liquidity 
requirements. The core pieces of legislation are the first 
banking Directive, the second banking Directive and the 
related solvency ratios Directive, and the draft capital 
requirements Directive. 
The first banking Directive (77/780/EEC) introduced the 
freedom of establishment and national treatment for banks 
in the EU. The directive required national authorities to 
cooperate closely to supervise the activities of credit 
institutions operating in several member states, amongst 
others the monitoring of the liquidity and solvency (Art. CAPITAL ADEQUACY VS. LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS IN BANKING SUPERVISION IN THE EU | 7 
 
7.1). It therefore created the Banking Advisory 
Committee, the precursor of the CEBS. 
The second banking Directive (1989) introduced the free 
branching and provision of services in the EU, subject to 
authorisation and final control by the home country. The 
directive however leaves a few powers in the hands of the 
host country, such as the supervision of the liquidity of 
branches. Art 14. (Art. 41 in the consolidated banking 
Directive, 2000/12/EC) reads: 
Host Member States shall retain responsibility in 
cooperation with the competent authorities of the 
home Member State for the supervision of the 
liquidity of the branches of credit institutions 
pending further coordination. Without prejudice to 
the measures necessary for the reinforcement of 
the European Monetary System, host Member 
States shall retain complete responsibility for the 
measures resulting from the implementation of 
their monetary policies. Such measures may not 
provide for discriminatory or restrictive treatment 
based on the fact that a credit institution is 
authorized in another Member State. 
The monetary policy argument was used by France 
against the introduction of interest-bearing current 
accounts by Barclays Bank on its territory in 1997. 
Today, however, this no longer makes any sense. 
A related area where some harmonisation has been 
undertaken by the EU is in the deposit guarantee 
Directive. The deposit guarantee requirements cannot be 
characterised as liquidity regulation in a strict sense, since 
they function ex-post and are external to the bank. Yet it 
needs to be mentioned, as it is justified on the same 
grounds as liquidity regulation, i.e. financial stability, 
which is a host country responsibility, and a renewed 
debate on further harmonisation of deposit protection 
schemes in the EU may spill over to liquidity regulation.
10 
The 1994 deposit guarantee schemes Directive rendered 
depositor protection obligatory and set a minimum level 
of compensation, but the actual levels of deposit 
protection, the funding and pay-out mechanism remained 
at the discretion of the member states. Today, the 
responsible authority for deposit protection for branches 
is the home country, but a ‘non-export’ provision applies 
for branches of countries with higher levels of depositor 
protection, and a ‘topping up’ option in the host country 
for branches of countries with lower levels. Subsidiaries 
fall under the responsibility of the host country. 
Liquidity Requirements in the Member States 
Different countries have found it necessary to regulate 
liquidity in the banking sector and have adopted a variety 
of approaches to liquidity regulation, from quantitative to 
qualitative, or a mixture of both. This typically involves 
setting some form of liquidity ratio as a minimum 
requirement, complemented by broader systems and 
controls related to management of liquidity risk.  
                                                        
10 See European Commission (2005). 
Table 1. Liquidity requirement systems in the EU member 
states and the US 
Quantitative only  Mix  Qualitative only 
Germany Belgium  Spain 
Austria Denmark  Sweden 
 Finland  US 
 France   
 Greece   
 Italy   
 The  Netherlands   
 UK   
Source: CEBS, Bank of England and authors’ own investigations. 
Within the quantitative requirement, national approaches 
differ between a stock and a maturity mismatch approach, 
or a combination of both. A stock approach prescribes a 
minimum level of cash or high-quality liquid or 
marketable assets in relation to the stock of deposits and 
other liabilities. The definitions of what constitutes a 
stock, or liquidity thereby differ from country to country. 
Maturity mismatch analysis involves the classification of 
expected inflows and outflows of funds into time-bands 
according to their residual maturity, subject to minimum 
criteria. Some regimes also include a degree of internal 
estimation of likely liquidity stress impact and analysis, 
generally limited to a floor.  
Furthermore there is considerable variation in the scope of 
national regimes and whether it is applied on a 
consolidated (group) or unconsolidated (solo) basis. The 
UK and the Netherlands apply liquidity regulation on a 
consolidated basis, whereas in Germany and France the 
focus is on the unconsolidated deposit-taking entity. 
Given the increasing number of internationally active 
banks and banks’ global liquidity management policies, a 
fundamental question is whether the solo approach still 
makes sense, i.e. whether local entities can be ring-fenced 
from overall liquidity problems in a bank (Bank of 
England, 2003). On the other hand, it could be argued that 
since banks monitor liquidity globally, they should 
diversify it globally as well, taking into account differing 
liquidity needs arising in different locations. This would 
also make sense from a systemic stability point of view. 
As one major global bank puts it: 
Diversification of our funding profile in terms of 
investor types, regions, products and instruments 
is an important element of our liquidity risk 
management framework. Our core funding 
resources, such as retail, small/mid-cap and 
fiduciary deposits as well as long-term capital 
markets funding, form the cornerstone of our 
liability profile. Customer deposits, funds from 
institutional investors and interbank funding are 
additional sources of funding. We use interbank 
deposits primarily to fund liquid assets.
11 
Such an approach would fit with the New Basel Accord, 
which emphasises the need to diversify the risk exposure 
                                                        
11 Extract of the chapter on liquidity risk in the 2004 Annual 
Report of Deutsche Bank (http://annualreport.deutsche-
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of a bank, to classify assets according to their riskiness 
and liquidity and stimulates banks to move towards 
internal methods to measure its capital needs, while 
giving supervisors the discretion to intervene depending 
of the risk profile of the bank. 
A survey on liquidity regulation by the Euribor ACI 
Money Market and Liquidity Working Group of the 
international association of foreign exchange dealers 
(Association des Cambistes International – ACI) calls for 
internal liquidity management models. It learns that most 
major banks in the euro area have such models in place 
for the management of their liquidity, even in countries 
with a very light liquidity regulation. The internal 
liquidity models are based on Best Market Practice and 
the  “Sound Practices  for Managing Liquidity in Banking 
Organisations” published by the Basel Committee. 
However, the association sees an inconsistency between 
the domestic regulation of liquidity and the integrated 
money market at the level of the euro area. National 
regulations lead to distortions in liquidity and securities 
pricing, and hamper the level playing field of banks (De 
Vidts, 2005). 
Data from the ECB show that large EU-15 banks have 
27.5% of their assets in liquid financial market 
instruments, compared to 22.2% for medium-sized banks, 
19.5% for small banks and 35.4% for foreign-owned 
banks. This compares to depositor liabilities of on average 
41.9% for all banks (see Table 2). The liquidity ratio in 
the new member states is on average higher, but with a 
lower ratio to deposits. 
Table 2. Liquidity levels in the EU-15 and the new member states 
 
EU-15 All  banks  Large  Medium  Small  Foreign 
Liquidity asset ratio 1 (cash and T-bills)  2.2  2.0  2.6  4.6  1.3 
Liquidity asset ratio 2 (ratio 1 + loans to credit institutions)  18.0  18.1  17.8  17.5  27.8 
Liquidity asset ratio 3 (ratio 2 + debt securities by public 
sector bodies)  25.8 27.5  22.2 19.5  35.4 
Depositor  liabilities  41.9 38.8  46.8 64.9  29.1 
Ratio 3 to deposits  61.6  71.0  47.5  30.1  121.8 
New member states           
Liquidity asset ratio 1 (cash and T-bills)  14.9  16.7  17.5  14.3  14.1 
Liquidity asset ratio 2 (ratio 1 + loans to credit institutions)  31.5  30.9  29.3  36.1  31.8 
Liquidity asset ratio 3 (ratio 2 + debt securities by public 
sector bodies)  36.8 39.4  38.0 43.9  35.6 
Depositor  liabilities  65.7 70.0  69.5 71.3  63.7 
Ratio 3 to deposits  56.0  56.3  54.6  61.6  55.9 
Source: ECB (2004). 
 
Any need for EU intervention? 
The current liquidity control framework, whereby the 
responsibilities are left with the host country supervisory 
authorities, is consistent with the broader framework for 
financial supervision, as put forward by the Basel 
Committee and contained in EU law. The home country is 
in charge of exercising consolidated supervision of a 
banking group which is active in the EU, and will decide 
on the validation and final shape of the internal ratings-
based model, under the Basel II framework. The host 
country authorities are in charge of controlling financial 
stability and overseeing the deposit protection system, and 
are accountable to local taxpayers.  
Liquidity requirements are a first line of defence in case 
of a bank run, and can be better monitored locally in the 
current circumstances, by those who have knowledge of 
the local requirements and the local banking market, 
rather than at home country level. This does not mean 
however that certain actions cannot be undertaken at EU 
level, to stimulate the exchange of information and trust 
among supervisors, and arrive at some level of 
standardisation of what can be considered as liquid assets 
and what the ratio should be. The CEBS forms the ideal 
forum to pursue initiatives on this subject, following up 
on steps undertaken before by the Group de Contact.  
We would certainly not argue for a full harmonisation of 
liquidity requirements at EU level. The capital 
requirements Directive, implementing the New Basel 
Accord in EU law, already requires banks to implement a 
much more calibrated risk management framework, based 
on external credit agencies’ assessments for smaller 
banks, and on internal ratings for larger institutions. In 
addition, it allows a supervisor to intervene promptly in 
case a financial institution falls below the capital 
requirements, by requiring an institution to hold more 
own funds, to apply a specific provisioning policy and to 
restrict its activities. Furthermore, it requires financial 
institutions to have internal controls in place to assess and 
maintain on an ongoing basis the amounts, types and 
distribution of internal capital to be adequate to cover the 
nature and level of risks to which they are exposed (Art. 
123). Internal control requirements are also set in most, if 
not all member states for all listed companies in company 
law or corporate governance codes. This should also be 
the approach for liquidity requirements: banks should 
have the internal mechanisms to monitor their liquidity 
requirements, subject to some general guidelines.  CAPITAL ADEQUACY VS. LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS IN BANKING SUPERVISION IN THE EU | 9 
 
The next step, pending further market integration, would 
be to introduce mutual recognition of national liquidity 
requirement systems. This could already be done today 
for the countries of the euro area, given the existence of a 
single currency and the harmonisation of collateral. Hence 
the home country’s liquidity requirement system would 
be applicable throughout the EU, although monitoring of 
funding requirements could be done in cooperation with 
the host country authorities. Given the existence of the 
Basel Guidelines on liquidity requirements and market 
integration, a convergence of liquidity requirements could 
be expected in the EU.  
To achieve that objective, the CEBS should continue the 
work undertaken by the Groupe de Contact and set 
standards of best practice for liquidity requirements in the 
EU. In addition, to strengthen trust amongst supervisory 
authorities, the creation of an EU clearing house for 
supervisory information could be considered. Today, the 
home-hosts relationships are run on a bilateral basis, 
which does not necessarily improve trust among 
supervisory authorities.  
Conclusions 
Liquidity requirements on financial institutions could 
reduce endogenous liquidity shocks. At the same time, 
however, regulators should bear in mind that more liquid 
bank assets could contribute to risk-taking by banks. 
Moreover, banks are increasingly vulnerable to wider 
fluctuations in market liquidity, against which liquidity 
requirements are of limited use.  
Any initiative to harmonise liquidity requirements at the 
EU level should therefore be carefully balanced. As long 
as financial stability, depositor protection and 
supervisor’s accountability are host country 
responsibilities, there is no immediate reason to change 
the present framework. It might be advisable, 
nevertheless, to set minimum guidelines for liquidity 
requirements in the EU, based upon the Basel 
Committee’s principles, and to strengthen the home 
country rule in the implementation of liquidity 
requirements, certainly within the euro area.  
Under normal circumstances, maintaining a minimum of 
liquidity on a decentralised basis should be a standard 
practice within well-run banks. The implementation of the 
New Basel Accord will largely strengthen the internal 
appreciation of risk and risk diversification, away from 
the very crude asset weightings that are in place at 
present. Moreover, financial market liberalisation, 
innovations and technological developments have 
rendered markets significantly more liquid over the last 
15 years. 
The latter developments may however also contribute to 
global financial instability. Under such circumstances, 
liquidity requirements will be of little help. They can only 
be considered as a first line of defence against a bank run, 
to prevent a single banking problem from becoming 
systemic. Regional or global systemic instability will 
require immediate and large-scale action by the 
authorities, but it is beyond doubt that the strengthening 
of the international financial architecture that has been 
undertaken over the last decade at the initiative of the G-7 
has largely come to meet such potential problems. 
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